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DATE OF DECISION 
The Defendant was found guilty of Criminal Homicide Murder 
in the Second Degree, a First Degree Felony, by a jury on the 16th 
day of March, 1990. Defendant was sentenced on the 18th day of 
April, 1990, to serve a term in the Utah State Prison of not less 
than one (1), nor more than fifteen (15) years for the charge of 
Manslaughter, Judge Rodney Page exercising his discretion to 
reduce the charge from Criminal Homicide Murder in the Second 
Degree, a First Degree Felony, to Criminal Homicide Manslaughter, 
a Second Degree Felony. 
The Defendant filed for post conviction relief, requesting 
that she be granted an appeal which was received by the Clerk of 
the Second Judicial District Court, County of Davis, State of Utah 
on the 18th day of April, 1990, along with the Motion for 
Certificate of Probable Cause. 
This appeal, was directed to the Utah Court of Appeals by the 
Davis County Clerk, through the filing of a Certificate on Appeal 
on June 5, 199 0. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 1, 1989, Linda Peterson, the Defendant and her 
boyfriend her boyfriend, Michel Bertrand, had been living together 
for a number of months in her home located in Layton, Utah. Mr. 
Bertrand had been involved in an angry dispute with his ex-wife 
over his rights of visitation with his children that had expanded 
2 
o v p r ?, +"w^ / n N *-- ^ l u n e ;" "• awiita, ^ • r o d . Mr. H e r t r a n d ' s n>:~wi f a , 
C a r c -1 \ : / a m r > < - " T > ^ * 11 ol > ,i s 1 f a i. i u i1 i i u i: i 11 y t h a i 
* ;- '•: ' .; '• . . . :Vi n he-: - a ' t r ^ n d ha j t i n a "1 y , I h r o u q h 
h I ^  it." :":•'. : i- • ^ r a n g e m e n t s + / i s i t • 11 n i d i i,, II 
r e s i u c n v - ^ - - T v n t i r 1 I Tit:- and .ni<- -* w, IV- wa • p.-*- - - o * r - *• 
i p p c i nt.r- i i \? *• r , / ... ;a . 
• * • * - .wi, ... ; ..<
 t. .,< . ; AV. nonu- \. , r ! ; n . _/r «, r , 
i i i <r: . i n a 1'4 ) 
*: < n n f " : ; r j r - ; WDI I- i r : * * , > * . n^ ^^ ~ ~ t t h e 
::TI}>] . , a i o i t o n i g h t f a l l when Mi :u-: H» : r r a = came 
*< n e r I" n,~a -t a a ) . oy i tra* ol y ' * *: 
' c : ' >^a, . . . r<u i : * '*' ; a s 
, - t J ...$ _a a a i g h i L ' t a a.:p<\tke a , v iiec<a of ,hfjfjC^ ' T a y r 
. : * - iiu - fr a !.—.t . -•• > : : . . l y 
D e f e n d a r a - - n c a t e d t h a t Mica* i ^ ' ^ - p e r t i o d ' 
v t> • ; : : a a - r • * A' - -.ome c h i c k e n ind a 
1
 • - ;aicaa ii\)r J- : D e f e n d a n t t h e n t o o k 
a b a t h an i c l e a n e d u\ for t h e evr-r- r t h e n o t o n d a n ! ranie 
c ii - ' i . - r t r a n d had q a a e t o 
s <*<p -~ a u u j i U i i a n a t n u i n - h*n r ^ e i i n g s . ( T p . 5 3 9 , 
l i n e 2) 
The Defendant indicated that she and Mr. Bertrand had 
discussed the difficulties they were having in their relationship 
and had talked about the possibility of him moving out of her 
house. (Tp. 538, line 3) The Defendant determined that she had 
worked hard and deserved a break away from the house without Mr. 
Bertrand, whereupon she left a note and called a cab to take her 
to an acquaintances house in Sunset, Utah. (Tp. 539, line 22) 
Just prior to the arrival of the cab, Mr. Bertrand awoke and 
found the Defendant outside of the house waiting for the cab. He 
became angry that she intended to leave the house, became 
physically abusive to the Defendant and this physical struggle 
continued as the cab, driven by Jay Sevy, came in response to her 
call. (Tp. 44, line 22) Mr. Sevy testified that, 
"The woman was trying to get away and the guy 
was grabbing at her and slapping her.11 (Tp. 
45, line 13) 
The cabby indicated that the altercation was bad enough that 
had he not been picking up the Defendant as a fare and taking her 
away from the scene, he would have called a police officer and 
reported the assault. (Tp. 46, line 25) The cab driver helped 
the Defendant with her things into the cab and indicated that, 
"Her face looked like it was puffed up, looked 
like she had been crying." (Tp. 49, line 10) 
and that, 
"Her demeanor was hysterical and crying." 
(Tp. 52, line 10) 
The cab driver testified that, 
"She had asked her boyfriend to get out." 
4 
(Tp. 52, line 13) 
It was approximately 11:30 p.m. on September 1st when Mr. 
Sevy took the Defendant from her residence in Layton and drove to 
the Toponce residence in Sunset. The Defendant arrived there at 
approximately 11:45 p.m. with her dog, some rum and coke, a couple 
of beers, some night clothes and a backgammon game. (Tp. 67, line 
20) . The Defendant met Richard Toponce at the residence and they 
fixed a drink and set about to playing backgammon. 
Approximately thirty (30) minutes after arriving the 
Defendant made a phone call to her house and told Mich that she 
did not want him there when she got back. (Tp. 73, line 11) She 
told him to leave the keys on the counter. The Defendant and Mr. 
Toponce drank some into the evening, playing backgammon and 
eventually the encounter led to sexual relations between the two 
(2). (Tp. 77, line 10) 
At approximately 3:00 a.m. to 3:30 a.m. on September 2nd, the 
Defendant got sick and requested Richard Toponce to call a cab, 
which he did. The cab that picked up the Defendant from the 
Toponce at approximately 4:00 a.m. was driven by Mr. Dean Steeley. 
He drove the Defendant back to her residence in Layton. He 
indicated that the Defendant did not talk much in the cab, but 
asked him in to the residence to get his check. (Tp. 103, line 
10) 
The cab driver entered the residence with the Defendant and 
went into the kitchen. At that time a man came out dressed only 
in bikini underwear and asked the cab driver if he was Linda's new 
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fuck, (Tp. 106, line 19) whereupon Defendant immediately told the 
man to leave her house. (Tp. 107, line 7) Defendant then went 
past him and down the hallway of her residence, whereupon the cab 
driver heard a crashing sound, like someone being pushed into the 
wall and pictures falling from the wall to the floor. (Tp. 108, 
line 19) He heard gasping and choking sounds coming from the 
hallway and heard a woman's voice cry, 
"Don't choke me!11 (Tp. 109, line 5) 
The cab driver next saw the Defendant go to the telephone, 
just outside the kitchen, in the hallway and call the police, 
requesting that they come immediately as she was being attacked 
and choked and wanted the man out of the house. (Tp. 110, line 
21) The Defendant told the police dispatch on the telephone that 
she 
"did not want to die". (Tp. 151, line 1) 
After the call Mr. Bertrand came back down with his pants on 
to the kitchen and asked Mr. Steeley to move his cab, which he 
did. (Tp. Ill, line 23) 
When Mr. Steeley came back to the door, he heard a crashing 
sound again and screaming. (Tp. 117, line 24) He opened the door 
and heard Mr. Bertrand yelling obscenities like 
"whore", "slut", (Tp. 120, line 8) and "get 
her off of me". 
Mr. Steeley saw the victim holding the Defendant by her hair and 
shirt and hitting her head against the wall near the bottom of the 
stairs. (Tp. 118, line 16) He indicated that the Defendant broke 
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away and turned to go upstairs whereupon Mr. Bertrand caught her 
again near the top of the lower flight of stairs and hit the 
Defendant into the door a number of times. (Tp. 121, line 19) 
Mr. Steeley told Mr. Bertrand to let the Defendant go and 
said that 
"she is trying like a son-of-a-gun to get 
away". (Tp. 157, line 8) 
Mr. Steeley saw the Defendant go upstairs and Mich go downstairs. 
The Defendant then returned to the stairway carrying a small 
kitchen knife, leaning over the upper landing of the stairway, 
hollering for Mr. Bertrand to get out. (Tp. 164, line 14) 
The Defendant then proceeded down the stairs to approximately 
the third step from the bottom and at that time the victim came 
around the corner in an upright position, 
"like a flash". (Tp. 166, line 6) 
The witness did not see clearly as it was somewhat dark down the 
stairway, but he testified that the Defendant did not make any 
kind of stabbing motion, overhand or otherwise, and that the knife 
was held in front of her. (Tp. 167, line 11) 
After the Defendant and Mr. Bertrand came together, Mr. 
Steeley heard Mr. Bertrand say "Oh God, she stabbed me" and the 
Defendant saying "now leave", with Mr. Bertrand saying "I cannot 
drive", (Tp. 127, line 7) whereupon the victim collapsed at the 
bottom of the stairs. 
Mr. Steeley went down the stairs, noticed the knife at the 
feet of the victim, grabbed the knife and carried it to the sink 
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in the kitchen. He went back to the basement and noticed blood 
on the victim's hand and got a cloth and put it in the victim!s 
hand. When the police officers arrived, Mr. Steeley told them, 
"it was in self defense". (Tp. 131, line 25) 
He later told an officer, 
"I feel she was acting in self defense. He 
was brutally beating on her." (Tp. 194, line 
6) 
When the police officers arrived they found the victim dead 
or dying at the bottom of the stairs and the Defendant in the 
garage. They found blood on the wall of the lower stairwell, just 
above the riser of step number two (2) and approximately twenty 
inches (20") high. (Tp. 229, referring to Exhibit "19") They 
also found an indention in the wall behind the door with fresh 
plaster dust on the doorknob. (Tp. 227, referring to Exhibit lfi7" 
and Exhibit "18") The Defendant was placed under arrest, put in 
a patrol car and taken to the Layton Police Department. 
Defendant indicated to any of the officers that asked, that 
she had acted in self defense. She told Officer Brown that her 
action was not intentional. (Tp. 311, line 13) She was in enough 
distress to warrant a check by physicians. The officers suspected 
the Defendant was hyperventillating, (Tp. 308, line 16) but in his 
concern for physical condition he called the paramedics and she 
was taken to the hospital. 
Officer Beckett testified that she heard the Defendant tell 
a nurse, 
"I was beat up, I was beat against the wall, 
like slammed, you know", (Tp. 330, line 2) 
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and that her head hurt. At one point the Defendant said 
"Lord, let me die, I took somebody's life, 
take me now." 
Her effect changed drastically from loud yelling to crying to a 
totally subdued mood. 
The doctor treated the Defendant for emotional trauma, gave 
her shot of Valium and checked her physically, finding no 
immediate indication of physical trauma to the Defendant, but 
testified that did not mean that she hadn't been thrown up against 
the wall or traumatized physically. (Tp. 325, line 15) 
Officer Madsen, the booking officer, indicated that the 
Defendant was 
"very upset emotionally, she was crying. 
Physically her face was quite flushed, her 
eyes were red. She was very emotionally upset 
and distraught." (Tp. 334, line 7) 
Defendant was very cooperative during the booking procedure, but 
because of her emotional state at times the booking process had 
to be discontinued for her to calm down. The Defendant told 
Officer Madsen that 
"I killed him. I killed my boyfriend. I will 
never see him again." (Tp. 335, line 14) 
and that she cried most of the time, telling the officer that 
"It was not my responsibility." 
The Defendant asked the officer what it felt like when the 
officer found himself in a position where he had to shoot someone. 
(Tp. 339, line 11) Defendant indicated that her head hurt and she 
wanted to go home and go to sleep. (Tp. 341, line 4) 
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Dr. Todd Gray from the State Medical Examiner's Office 
testified that the victim died of a small knife wound to the 
middle of the chest, penetrating the sternum, piercing the heart 
and the esophagus. He indicated that it could have been virtually 
instantaneous. Dr. Gray testified that such a wound would have 
resulted in a small spurt of blood with the removal of the knife 
and the tissues would likely swell and tend to close the opening, 
limiting external bleeding. (Tp. 363, line 23) 
He indicated that there were no hilt marks on the victim 
which meant that the knife was not forced through the victim hard 
enough to result in bruising caused by the handle of the knife. 
(Tp. 365, line 12) Dr. Gray testified that he had examined the 
Defendant's clothing, but the majority of the blood stains was on 
her sweat pants approximately four inches (4") below the top of 
the pants and down mostly on the left side of the front of the 
pants. (Tp. 381, line 22) There was little or no blood from the 
waist band to the top of the sweatshirt. 
Dr. Gray admitted that the Defendant's version of the facts 
was a reasonable explanation of the delivery of the wound to the 
victim. (Tp. 395, line 9) That the blood splatter on the wall, 
stairs and clothing of the Defendant appeared to be in all the 
right places to verify the Defendant's explanation of the events. 
(Tp. 41, line 13) The Dr. indicated that his only concern was 
that under Defendant's explanation the victim would likely have 
continued on forward into the Defendant, causing some actual 
contact and likely resulting in smeared blood on the Defendant and 
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the victim. However, he admitted that the relative positioning 
of the two (2) people involved with the knife being held by the 
Defendant at approximately her strongest point, i.e., center of 
gravity, and with the vertical element to the motion of the 
Defendant, the possibility that the victim may have had some 
reaction to stop his forward momentum may all have had an effect 
in keeping the victim from falling over onto the Defendant. 
The Statefs blood expert, Jim Bell, testified that he had 
concerns over the Defendant's version of the facts not resulting 
in the victim falling into the Defendant. However, Mr. Bell had 
to admit that the State's version of the facts required some 
fairly fancy footwork on the part of the Defendant to avoid the 
victim bleeding on her at a level higher than four inches (4fl) 
below the top of her sweat pants, postulating that perhaps the 
Defendant had stabbed the victim while he was higher than her on 
the stairway and then immediately rushed away from the victim so 
that minimum of blood would have sprayed on her. 
The Defendant's investigator, Keith Taylor, an Ogden City 
Police Officer, testified as to photographs that he took of 
injuries to the Defendant, including a bruise on her right knee, 
bruise on her higher left leg, bruise on her right buttock, bruise 
on her left upper arm, bruise on her left leg front, bruise on her 
chest and bruises to her head. (Tp. 486, various lines) Dr. 
Berwell, the Defendant's personal physician, testified that he 
found the same bruises and gave a description of the size and 
location of each of these bruises. (Tp. 517) 
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The Defendant testified that she did not get the knife with 
the intention of using it against the victim, but that she got it 
to make certain that the victim did not attack her again. (Tp. 
557, line 14) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The District Court, at the end of the State's case in 
chief, erred in not granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal, based upon the State's failure at that point in the 
Trial to prove that the Defendant did not act in her own self 
defense. 
2. The jurys' verdict of guilt to Criminal Homicide Murder 
in the Second Degree (First Degree Homicide) was against the clear 
weight of the evidence on the issue of self defense and reasonable 
minds could not have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL 
At the close of the presentation of the State's evidence, the 
Defendant, through her attorney, John T. Caine, moved the Court 
for a Judgment of Acquittal. In this Motion it was suggested to 
the Court that the State had presented the charge as a Second 
Degree Murder and therefore, had to prove one of three (3) factual 
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circumstances outlined by the statute to secure a conviction. It 
was clear that the State did not allege or even intend to show 
that this was an intentional killing. (Tp. 465, line 6) 
The State's case hinged on the other two (2) alternatives. 
One being that the Defendant recklessly, intending to cause 
serious bodily harm or other injury, committed an act of homicide, 
or that she acted in a way evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life and thereby caused the death of another. 
The Court of Appeals has ruled recently in the case of 
State v. Harman, 767 P. 2d, 567 (Utah Appellate 1989) that in 
reviewing the results of a jury trial, 
"we reverse only when the evidence 
is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable, that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the Defendant committed the crime . . . .!l 
The Court went on to state that, 
"although this a high standard, it is not 
insurmountable. We will not make "speculative 
leaps across remaining gaps" in the 
evidence .... every element of the crime must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the 
evidence does not support those elements the 
verdict must fail." (Id at 568) 
Defendant argues that as the Motion for Acquittal was before 
the Judge and resulted in a judicial decision, that this Court 
should use the standard of review discussed in the Utah State 
Supreme Court decision of State v. Goodman, 763, P.2d 786 (Utah 
1988) , where the standard was that the decision of the Trial Court 
must be sustained unless it is 
"against the clear weight of the evidence or 
if the Appellate Court otherwise reaches a 
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definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made." 
and later states that 
"in reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency 
of the evidence, we require that the weight 
of the evidence; discounting questions of 
credibility and demeanor not oppose the 
verdict." (Id at 786-87) 
Defendant recognizes that the verdict was rendered by a jury 
in the present case. However, because of the Motion to Dismiss, 
this Court has the opportunity to review the decision making 
process of the Judge in this case and alleges that the evidence 
presented by the close of the State's case simply did not rise to 
the level required for a conviction of Second Degree Murder. 
There were three (3) eyewitnesses to the actions which 
resulted in Mr. Bertrand's death. That being the victim, who of 
course was not able to testify in this Trial, although his actions 
prior to the time of death spoke clearly as to his emotional state 
and intentions prior to the actions which resulted in his death; 
the Defendant, who at the time of the defense Motion for Acquittal 
had not had the opportunity to testify; and finally, the cab 
driver, Mr. Steeley, who made it absolutely clear to everyone who 
listened, that he had witnessed the entire event and testified to 
a set of facts that clearly pointed to an act of self defense on 
the part of the Defendant. 
The State's experts also testified that the evidence they 
analyzed was consistent with the observations made of the events 
by the eyewitness and subsequently by the Defendant and could only 
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point to a single factor that they found troubling in reviewing 
the events outlined by the defense's position. This factor was 
doggedly held to by the State throughout the course of the 
investigation and the Trial. 
The State's experts were called to say that if the victim had 
come around the corner of the basement and up the stairs, 
essentially running into the Defendant, that the force or momentum 
of his moving body would have forced the body, after being 
stabbed, to come into contact with the Defendant, smearing the 
blood on her sweatpants that she was wearing. 
However, the State's Medical Examiner, Dr. Todd Gray, 
admitted during cross-examination that there were a number of 
potential factors involved in what effect the relative forces the 
knife and the two (2) individuals acting out the event would have 
had on the end result. 
Dr. Gray admitted that the positioning of the knife as 
testified by cab driver, Dean Steeley, as being held by the 
Defendant in both hands in front of her at approximately belly 
button level or below, placed the knife in the most stable 
position for her torso, basically at her center of gravity. (Tp. 
401, line 19) Dr. Gray also admitted that the resulting force on 
the victim of the knife, pushing it at approximately the level of 
his sternum, was a position of far less stability on the victim, 
agreeing with the proposition that it is easier to push a person 
away when the force is applied at the top of the person, than it 
is to push a person away from forces applied at the middle. (Tp. 
15 
401, line 25) 
Dr. Gray also reviewed the possibility that the Defendant's 
reflex action to push the victim away from her may have had some 
effect on the force applied at the end of the knife. (Tp. 402, 
line 12) The Doctor further agreed that the force or momentum of 
the victim was somewhat dissipated in his rising up the steps, 
stating that 
"there is a vertical component to the motion.11 
(Tp. 403, line 4) 
Dr. Gray also testified as to the mistaken assumption being 
made by the State in espousing what the State considered to be 
this problem of no smeared blood on the Defendant and that is that 
"it assumes the body tripped or has fallen, 
went in a forward motion." (Tp. 4 05, line 
11) 
The evidence presented by the eyewitness was that the victim 
did not immediately lose muscular control upon being stabbed. In 
fact his testimony was that the victim stood in place for a moment 
of time and made a number of comments before falling backwards 
down the last two (2) stairs, where he was found by the police in 
the appropriate position for having been stabbed and dying on the 
second step of the lower stairwell as described by the 
eyewitnesses. 
The State wanted very badly to leave the impression with the 
jury that the Defendant was somehow below the victim at the time 
the stabbing took place and that the victim was stabbed by the 
Defendant, using a strong overhand stabbing motion as is seen in 
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the movies, such as "Psycho". 
The myriad of inconsistencies in this scenario so far 
outweigh the alleged concern with the defense version as to make 
it utterly unbelievable. First of all the scenario is in direct 
conflict with the eyewitness testimony, also, the blood pattern 
found on the clothing worn by the Defendant, as well as the blood 
found on the wall and steps at the second step and below could not 
have occurred under the State's scenario. Mr. Bell attempted to 
make it sound possible regarding the blood found on the 
Defendant's clothing by stating that she could have somehow run 
up to the victim and stabbed him with an overhand motion with the 
victim above her on the stairway and then somehow, with her short 
5'0" frame, pull the knife out of the wound and through an act of 
gymnastics, jump almost clear of the resulting arterial spurting 
blood that would then miraculously not fall on her hand, arm, 
chest or abdomen, but only land on her sweatpants, approximately 
four inches (4") below the top and down her leg. 
Although the State's witness could not give an particular 
indication as to why the Defendant would want to go to this 
trouble, it is rather unlikely that her actions were taken in the 
heat of such a moment, leaving her with the mental acuity to jump 
away from the victim at just the right angle to make the blood 
spots on herself coincide exactly with what would become the 
defense's scenario of the events. This is not to mention the 
difficulty the State would have in trying to show how if the 
victim was stabbed near the top of the lower landing of the 
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stairs, with the Defendant below him, how he managed to bleed only 
on the bottom two (2) stairs of that stairwell while walking 
mortally wounded all the way down the lower half of the stairs, 
reaching the bottom in time to turn around and fall on his back. 
Curiously the State did not really attempt to describe that 
scenario in any detail to the Court or to the jury, recognizing 
that it simply did not hold up under the physical evidence that 
was found at the scene, not to mention the eyewitness testimony. 
The most incredible fact of all in support the defense fs 
version of this event was demonstrated to Dr. Gray during his 
cross-examination, using the model of the stairs presented into 
evidence by the defense with the Defendant standing at 
approximately the third step of the model and defense attorney, 
Allen, who as indicated was the same height as the victim in this 
case, walked around the corner and up the stairs and into the 
Defendant. That action as described by the eyewitness and 
demonstrated to Dr. Gray, the in-court demonstration by the 
defense, placed the knife in exactly the position on the victim 
as where the fatal wound actually occurred. (Tp. 387, line 19) 
Cleeirly the sheer weight of the physical evidence opposed the 
scenario proposed by the State and places the Defendant in a 
position where the actual stabbing was either an act of clear self 
defense, fending of the advance of the victim or very probably, 
an accidental act intended neither by the victim, nor the 
Defendant. The defense's position at Trial was that procuring the 
knife by the Defendant was an act of self defense and that the 
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actual stabbing was a result of an accidental collision of the 
Defendant and the victim. 
The State not only failed beyond a reasonable doubt to rebut 
this scenario, but in fact the defense proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that this was the actual set of events that resulted in the 
death of Michel Bertrand. 
The case of State v. Smith, 675 P.2d, 521 @ Pg. 524 (Utah 
1983) as referred to in the Utah Court of Appeals decision in 
State of Utah v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98, (Utah Appeals 1990) held 
that 
"the State is required to show some evidence 
of every element of its cause of action, or 
a lesser included offense, to avoid an 
unfavorable directed verdict at the close of 
its case in chief." 
The Court went on to say that 
"however the State is not required to prove 
a dearth of self defense as one of those 
elements." 
Quoting Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d, 211 
@ Pg. 214 (Utah 1985) where the Supreme Court ruled that 
"absence of self defense is not one of the 
prima facia elements of homicide." 
In the Strieby case the Court found that the State did meet 
its burden set forth in prima facia case. However, that case 
differed drastically from the present case, in that the Court in 
Strieby had not been given the Defendants version of the facts 
prior to the defense raising the element of self defense in its 
own portion of the case. 
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In the present case however, the State!s own witnesses, 
through the eyewitness testimony of the two (2) cab drivers and 
the testimony of Dr. Gray commenting on the in-court demonstration 
presented by the defense, clearly set forth the elements of self 
defense in the course of the State's case in chief. Therefore, 
it was not simply a matter for the State to present its elements 
and wait for the defense to bring up the issue of self defense, 
but in fact the issue of self defense was inherent in the case in 
chief presented by the State. 
The factual presentation of evidence by the State in the 
present case does allow the defense to raise the case of 
State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d, 211 (Utah 1985) on self defense in its 
argument that the Judge erred in not directing an acquittal after 
the State's case in chief. The Knoll case as described in 
Appellant's Brief in the Strieby case is controlling regarding the 
State's proof requirements in a case of self defense and makes it 
clear that once the issue is raised, it is the prosecutions burden 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the actions were not made 
in self defense. 
"A Defendant is not required to establish a 
defense of self defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt or even by a preponderance of the 
evidence In some, where there is a basis 
in the evidence where the evidence is produced 
by the prosecution of by the Defendant which 
would provide some reasonable basis for the 
jury to conclude that a killing was done to 
protect the Defendant from an eminent threat 
of death by another an instruction on self 
defense should be given the jury; and if the 
issue is raised, whether by the Defendant's 
or prosecution's evidence, the prosecution 
has the burden of proof, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the killing was not in self 
defense.11 (.Id at 214) (Emphasis added as 
quoted in Appellant's Brief in the case of 
State v. Strieby) 
In the present case the State could not allege that the 
victim was incapable of inflicting violence against the Defendant 
or that such an action was even against his nature. Mr. 
Bertrandfs ex-wife, Carolyn Zamora, testified that on prior 
occasions Mr. Bertrand had become extremely angry with her and had 
acted out that anger by hitting her. (Tp. 40, line 6) More 
recently, Mr. Bertrand had become so angry with his ex-wife that 
he had kicked in the rear fender of her vehicle. (Tp. 36, line 
1) 
Ms. Zamora further stated that Mr. Bertrand could be 
extremely angry and abusive over issues that involved his children 
and that she had been forced to allow visitation after refusing 
it to the victim for over two (2) months. She testified that her 
attorney had told her that on the 1st day of September she would 
have to allow visitation. Ms. Zamora testified that she was 
supposed to be home with the children for Mr. Bertrand to pick up 
at 7:00, but by the time she actually arrived home at 7:25, she 
found that Mr. Bertrand had been there and left and that when he 
returned to pick up the children, only his daughter, Tiffany, 
wanted to go with him. (Tp. 28, line 3-11) 
This course of events and the fact that the victim had been 
drinking (toxicology report indicated he had a blood alcohol level 
of .09 at the time of death) provide plenty of reasons for the 
21 
victim to be in a less than agreeable mood. 
The State in the present case was faced with a factual 
situation that made it clear or at least as clear as can be 
expected in such a case, as to the events leading up to the death 
of the victim and the manner in which he died. This scenario of 
the death of Michel Bertrand provided little or no evidence upon 
which the State could carry its burden of proof to show the 
Defendant was guilty of Second Degree Murder, nor did the State 
carry its required burden of proof on the issue of self defense. 
The Trial Courtfs refusal to enter an acquittal on the charge 
of Second Degree Murder at the end of the State's case in chief 
was against the clear weight of the evidence and should be 
reversed. 
POINT II 
THE JURYS1 VERDICT OF GUILT WAS RENDERED 
WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENTLY 
INCLUSIVE THAT REASONABLE PERSONS MUST 
HAVE MAINTAINED A REASONABLE DOUBT 
The ground rules for reviewing a jury verdict in the 
Appellate* Court is well established. The Rule is clear that the 
evidence in a case under review must be examined in a light most 
favorable to the jurys1 verdict. (See State v. Harman, Id at 568) 
As discussed previously in this Brief, this Court however, 
has made it clear in the Harman case that 
"although this is a high standard, it is not 
insurmountable. We will not make speculative 
leaps across remaining gaps in the evidence. 
Every element of the crime charged must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the 
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evidence does not support those elements the 
verdict must fail." (id at 568) 
This passage from the Harman case is quoted again under this 
argument of Defendant's appeal because of its importance to the 
defensefs second argument. 
The Defendant maintained at Trial and continues to allege in 
this appeal that her procurement of the knife on the early morning 
hours of September 2, 1989 was an action taken in her own self 
defense and further was an action completely justified by the 
events of that morning and the previous evening. 
It is important at this juncture to capsulize the abuse that 
the Defendant had been forced to endure during the period of time 
prior to the tragic death of Michel Bertrand. The evidence of the 
prior abuse is clearly corroborated by a number of different and 
independent witnesses and virtually unrebutted by the State. 
The Defendant testified that when she had determined that she 
had put in enough work at home and wanted to go out on her own in 
the evening, that she quietly called a cab and sat out in front 
of the house waiting for the cab to arrive. She testified that 
when Mr. Bertrand awoke and found that she was intending to leave 
he became upset, angry and physically abusive. 
The Defendant testified that Mr. Bertrand slapped her, 
grabbed her and shook her around and that she was very scared by 
his behavior. (Tp. 542, line 20) The fact that he had not really 
been physically abusive to her previously made this conduct all 
the more shocking to her. The Defendant also testified that this 
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physical abuse continued until the cab driver got out of his car 
in front of her house. Mr. Jay Sevy, the cab driver who arrived 
that night, clearly corroborated this testimony. The cab driver 
testified that in his opinion the abuse was bad enough that had 
he not been personally taking the Defendant from the scene, he 
would have referred the matter to the police. 
Mr. Sevy further testified he heard the Defendant say that 
she had told her boyfriend to get out of her house. This was the 
first of many corroborated statements made by the Defendant 
requesting that Mr. Bertrand leave her house permanently. 
Shortly after the Defendant arrived at the Toponce residence 
she was heard, as testified to by Richard Toponce, on the 
telephone specifically telling Mr. Bertrand that he was to pack 
his things and get out of her house and leave his keys on the 
counter, indicating that she was extremely upset by the physical 
altercation at her house and that she no longer wanted to maintain 
a relationship with Mr. Bertrand, at least not with him living in 
her residence. 
The State attempted to place the events at the Toponce 
residence in the most negative light possible. However, the 
actions of the Defendant there are extremely revealing. First of 
all, the Defendant does not return to her house for a matter of 
three (3) to four (4) hours after the telephone call to Mr. 
Bertrand, leaving the victim plenty of time to leave her residence 
without having to come into actual physical contact with him. 
During the course of the Defendant's stay with Richard Toponce she 
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attempts to calm herself by drinking alcoholic beverages and 
playing backgammon. At a later time, as the Defendant testified, 
they had sexual relations, which could be interpreted as an 
attempt to seek comfort after the breakup of her relationship with 
Mr. Bertrand. 
The Defendant then decides to return to her residence and 
feeling concerned about whether or not Bertrand has left her 
residence, asks the cab driver to assist her with her things and 
has him walk to the kitchen with her. At that time the second 
episode of physical and emotional abuse occurs. Mr. Bertrand 
shows his State of mind clearly with his opening comment regarding 
the cab driver who is sitting at kitchen counter. When the 
Defendant attempts to walk away from Mr. Bertrand, he follows her 
down the hall and according to the Defendant, slams her up against 
the wall, knocking the pictures from the wall to the floor and 
puts his arm around her neck choking her. This is verified by the 
testimony of the eyewitness who says that he hears the slam, the 
pictures falling, heard the Defendant gasping and gurgling and 
heard comments from her requesting that Mr. Bertrand stop choking 
her. 
The physical evidence is also corroborated of this event as 
the pictures are in fact found by the police, having fallen from 
their places on the wall and the victim is found to have a strong 
bite mark in a location that, according to Dr. Gray, was 
consistent with his arm around the neck of the Defendant. The 
Defendant at this time does not immediately rush for some type of 
25 
weapon in an attempt to injure the victim, which might have been 
the case if her motive was violence or revenge as the State seemed 
to imply, but in fact the Defendant goes straight to the telephone 
and dials the police, requesting their immediate assistance in 
getting Mr. Bertrand out of her house. This is now the third 
corroborative demand by the Defendant for Mr. Bertrand to leave 
her residence. 
The Defendant also informs dispatch that she has been 
assaulted and choked and that she was afraid for her life. This 
call was corroborated both by Mr. Seeley, the eyewitness, and also 
by the tape recording made at the Layton City Dispatch. At this 
point Mr. Bertrand appears to be acquiescing in the Defendant's 
demands to leave the residence and sends the cab driver out of the 
house ostensibly to move his car. 
By the time the eyewitness returns to the house he finds that 
Mr. Bertrand not only has not gotten in the truck to leave, but 
in fact has again grabbed onto the Defendant by the hair and shirt 
and is smacking her into the side wall at the bottom landing of 
the stairway. He indicates that the Defendant breaks away from 
the grasp and runs to the top of the stairs where she is again 
grabbed by Mr. Bertrand and slammed into the front door. 
The jury did not have to take the Defendant's word for this 
occurrence or even the corroboration of the eyewitness testimony, 
but was shown verification of this particular act of violence by 
photographs of the door handle showing a clear indention into the 
wall behind the door with plaster dust all over the door handle. 
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When the Defendant finally breaks the victim's grasp at the 
urging of the witness, Steeley, she has now been physically 
assaulted by Mr. Bertrand on four (4) distinct, separate-
occasions. Four (4) acts of specific violence perpetrated upon 
the Defendant by Michel Bertrand. 
Also during this time the Defendant has attempted on at least 
three (3) occasions to get Mr. Bertrand to leave her residence and 
leave her alone, including a desperate call to the Layton City 
Police Department. The Defendant is eminently justified at this 
point in time in gaining for herself some protection against 
further physical violence and to this end, she goes to the kitchen 
and gets a paring knife from the butcher block. The Defendant 
then returns to the stairwell and leans over the upper stair rail 
and again yells "get out". 
Not seeing Mr. Bertrand and not knowing what he is up to, the 
Defendant walks down the stairs, stopping at the third or second 
step from the bottom. To this point in time, the jury has not had 
to depend upon the mere testimony of the Defendant to believe the 
facts related. Every event is specifically corroborated by 
eyewitness testimony and physical evidence. There is not a single 
piece of evidence as here related that did not carry the weight 
of physical or eyewitness verification. 
At this point the Defendant testified that she did not know 
for sure where Mr. Bertrand was, but that she was holding the 
knife directly in front of her in a defensive posture, in a way 
she felt Mr. Bertrand would clearly see that she was not going to 
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allow him to cause her any further physical injury. She is also 
calling out "get out" so that Mr, Bertrand has no excuse for not 
knowing her desire. 
The Defendant states that at this time Mr. Bertrand comes 
around the* corner and up the stairway at her. She testified that 
he came at her at a rapid rate. Mr. Steeley testified that the 
victim looked like a "flash" coming around the corner from the 
family room of the house. He bounded up one (1) or two (2) steps 
to the point where, as the physical evidence and demonstration of 
the defense showed, the knife came directly into contact with the 
victim at his chest. Mr. Bertrand was stabbed one (1) time 
through the sternum, piercing the heart. A single mortal wound. 
The Statefs only attempt to contradict any of this evidence 
as stated previously was there contention that if the victim had 
come at the Defendant fast enough to become impaled upon the 
knife, that he would have had to have collided with the Defendant. 
The State's theory is analogous to the difficulty we might 
have in believing that we could be killed in an automobile 
accident, striking something when we were only going 2 0 mph. The 
laws of physics show however, that that accident can indeed be 
fatal if the object we strike has momentum of its own compounding 
the rate of force. 
It is extremely likely that as the victim came around the 
corner, surprising the Defendant, that she may have reacted by 
reflex as discussed with Dr. Gray by pushing the victim away. 
Unfortunately this push was made by a hand that contained a sharp 
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paring knife. The combination of the force caused a fatal wound 
to be inflicted upon Mr. Bertrand. 
Again, the jury did not have to take the Defendant's own 
testimony as the only evidence of this event. The evidence was 
clearly corroborated by the eyewitness testimony of the cab 
driver, Dean Steeley, and to a substantial degree was corroborated 
by the physical evidence. The blood stains on the Defendant's 
clothes were only found below her waist, except for one (1) odd 
drop of blood that wound up on her shoulder. This odd drop of 
blood was never tested to verify whose blood it was and the 
testimony clearly indicated that the Defendant had a cut behind 
her ear that bled and could have well been the cause for that one 
(1) drop of blood. 
The Defendant did not have blood on her sleeves or arms to 
any extent, clearly indicating that her arms and sleeves were at 
a level equal or higher than the wound suffered by Mr. Bertrand. 
The blood on the stairs and stair walls clearly indicate that the 
victim could not have been higher than on the first or second step 
from the bottom of the stairs at the time the wound was inflicted. 
The body was found lying on its back at the bottom of the stairs, 
which is the most natural resting place imaginable based upon the 
defense's scenario of the events. Finally, the wound lines up 
perfectly with the knife held by the Defendant in the way she 
testified as demonstrated to Dr. Gray. All of these events are 
clearly corroborated by the physical evidence and could not have 
been coincidental or invented by the Defendant. 
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This explanation of the events of the night of September 1st 
and the morning of September 2nd clearly do not give the State any 
evidence, much less evidence that reaches the level of proving a 
case beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed any 
of the possible elements of Second Degree Murder or of 
Manslaughter. 
The Judge in this case gave a confusing Jury Instruction 
regarding circumstantial evidence and what the jury was to do 
under circumstances where two (2) possible scenarios were equally 
as likely. The Rule of the law has been that the Defendant is 
entitled to the jurys1 belief in the Defendant's scenario of the 
events under that type of circumstantial case. 
The present case is extremely analogous to the case of 
State v. Strieby, although there are some specific differences. 
One difference is the fact that the present case was tried before 
a jury, whereas the Strieby case was tried before a Judge. The 
Court took cognizance of the fact that the Appellate Court could 
use a little different standard in a Judge Trial than was required 
in a Trial before a jury and Defendant is cognizant of that 
difference. 
However, the present case has some substantial factual 
advantages over the Strieby case in that all of the important 
testimony of the Defendant is verified by competent and 
independent eyewitness testimony. In this case the Court would 
not only have to "make speculative leaps11 across gaps in the 
evidence. (State v. Harman) But, in addition, the Court has to 
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at the same time climb over and ignore a great wall of evidence 
provided by eyewitness testimony and the physical evidence left 
at the scene to come to the conclusion that the State had proven 
the elements of the crime charged against the Defendant beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The State also failed to meet its burden identified in the 
case of State v. Knoll, 712 P. 2d, 214 and again referred to by the 
Court in Strieby. The State has to prove the absence of self 
defense after it is properly raised. In fact the Defendant in 
this case carries the burden to "establish a defense of self 
defense beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of 
the evidence". 
The only attempt made by the State to disprove the defense's 
allegations of self defense was testimony from the police officers 
that the Defendant did not appear physically damaged enough. The 
State's expert in this area, Dr. Condie, however, made it clear 
that the fact that there weren't immediately discernable cuts and 
bruises on the Defendant did not mean that she had not been 
traumatized. People vary in their reaction to physical trauma. 
Some people bruise easily, other people don't. The Defendant 
presented corroborating evidence from Keith Taylor, as well as Dr. 
Berwald to indicate that the Defendant did have a number of 
bruises and marks on her body following the events of September 
2nd. 
However, it is not the State's position to determine how much 
of a beating a person has to put up with before that person can 
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take action to defend herself. Unlike the Strieby case, the 
Defendant did not go up and grab a gun, which was clearly an 
offensive weapon that could be used to inflict mortal injury from 
a great distance away. The Defendant procured a small to middle 
sized knife from her kitchen and held it close to her body in a 
strictly defensive measure to keep Michel Bertrand from assaulting 
her physically again. 
The evidence in Strieby clearly showed that the Defendant 
fired the weapon at the victim, knowing that her actions would 
result in death or serious bodily injury to the victim. 
In the present case the State could not even clear that 
burden, as the evidence tended to show and verify the Defendant's 
contention that the actual stabbing was accidental or at the most, 
reflexive. 
Instead of presenting strong evidence in support of a case, 
the State attempted to portray an attitude or image of badness in 
the Defendant by having the police officers indicate that the 
Defendant showed no remorse after the death. This tactic must 
have been successful in light of the jurys1 verdict. However, it 
is not appropriate evidence to support the actual event. People 
react to stress and shock in different ways and even the police 
officers, who on the stand, attempted to say that the Defendant 
showed no remorse or emotion regarding the events that had just 
occurred, had to admit on cross-examination that the reports 
indicated quite to the contrary, very often showing that the 
Defendant was grossly remorseful and extremely shaken and upset 
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by the events. 
In addition, the Defendant's extemporaneous statements to 
these officers always included a reference to her action being 
unintentional and in self defense, putting into words the clear 
presumption of innocence that the Defendant was entitled to and 
which presumption the State never overcame. 
This Court's closing comment in the Strieby decision 
regarding the Judge's guilty verdict is equally applicable to this 
case in that the jurys1 verdict is "contrary to the clear weight 
of the evidence and as a result, that the State failed to prove 
the elements of Manslaughter (or Murder in the Second Decree) 
beyond a reasonable doubt." 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court, at the end of the State's case in chief, 
erred in not granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal, based upon the State's failure at that point in the 
Trial to prove that the Defendant did not act in her own self 
defense and the jurys1 verdict of guilt to Criminal Homicide 
Murder in the Second Degree (First Degree Felony) was against the 
clear weight of the evidence on the issue of self defense and 
reasonable minds could not have found giy^ Lt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this\28th dSktofI December, .1990. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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and responsibilities. 
78-3-25. Assistants for administrator of the 
courts — Appointment of trial court 
executives. 
78-3-26. Courts to provide information and sta-
tistical data to administrator of the 
courts. 
78-3-27. Annual judicial conference. 
78-3-28. Repealed. 
78-3-29. Presiding judge — Election — Term — 
Compensation — Powers — Duties. 
78-3-30. Duties of the clerk of the district court. 
78-3-31. Court commissioners — Qualifications 
— Appointment — Functions gov-
erned by rule. 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. R e p e a l e d . 1971,1981, 1988 
78-3-3. T e r m of j u d g e s — V a c a n c y . 
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed ini-
tially until the first general election held more than 
three years after the effective date of the appoint-
ment. Thereafter, the term of office for judges of the 
district courts is six years, and commences on the 
first Monday in January , next following the date of 
election A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is 
appointed and qualified. 1988 
78-3-4. J u r i s d i c t i o n — T r a n s f e r of cases to cir-
cuit c o u r t — A p p e a l s . 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all 
